When DIKO’s collective bodies decided in the summer of 2022 to support Nikos Christodoulides’s candidacy in the 2023 presidential elections, there was information suggesting that the party leadership had a clear picture of the views of the majority of its members. Leaks from within party organs indicated that behind closed doors there was an acknowledgement that six to seven out of ten DIKO voters supported Christodoulides’s candidacy.
This decision followed a lengthy dialogue with AKEL, which ultimately appeared to lead nowhere. AKEL was unwilling to consider a Nikolas Papadopoulos candidacy, while DIKO had already become alienated from its traditional ally. After the Mari explosion and the fiasco surrounding the election of the Speaker of the House in 2021, the distance between DIKO and AKEL widened significantly, and the two parties were no longer able to find common ground.
As a result, DIKO’s leadership concluded that there was no alternative and was drawn into an electoral alliance aimed at securing Christodoulides’s election, in order to avoid confrontation with the party base and the risk of alienating DIKO voters. From the outset, it was clear that this alliance would not be one between equals with the specific presidential candidate.
Concerns confirmed
The election of Nikos Christodoulides and the subsequent announcement of the Cabinet confirmed the concerns of some party figures who had, from the beginning, identified the unequal relationship between the candidate and the parties supporting him. The government that emerged did not include leading party figures, but rather individuals from the broader political space appointed as ministers due to technocratic expertise rather than political influence.
Over time, the problem became more pronounced, with complaints emerging about poor coordination and a lack of briefing of the governing parties by the Presidential Palace. Nevertheless, all three governing parties (DIKO, EDEK and DIPA) found themselves trapped, realising they had little choice but to endure treatment that weakened them politically, while at least granting them a limited share of power and a role in governance.
A School of thought emerges
Around two years after the presidential elections, voices began to be heard within DIKO advocating cooperation with DISY. Christodoulides’s initially high popularity declined due to missteps and actions that offended public sentiment, such as the staffing of the Presidential Palace with relatives and close personal connections. Post-election opinion polls also showed a decline in the governing parties’ support.
This led to the emergence of a minority school of thought within DIKO, led primarily by MP Chrysis Pantelides, which publicly highlighted the problems of co-governance and raised the prospect of cooperation with DISY.
According to this line of thinking, participation in government was damaging DIKO’s electoral prospects, while President Christodoulides was deliberately sidelining the governing parties and operating a “one-man show” model of governance. The President frequently announced measures without prior consultation with coalition partners. A notable example was his televised interview last March, during which he announced a VAT reduction that coalition parties learned about through the media.
While weekly meetings at the Presidential Palace were later established in response to internal reactions, coordination issues persist, with governing parties continuing to stress that relations with the Presidency could improve.
The idea of cooperation
The idea of cooperation with DISY was first publicly raised by Anastasia Papadopoulou in July 2024, when she stated that if the conditions of 2023 no longer existed, DIKO would inevitably cooperate either with DISY or AKEL. This was later echoed by MP Chrysis Pantelides in interviews in May and August 2025, where he highlighted common ground with DISY.
DISY MP Harris Georgiades responded positively, arguing that alignment between DISY, DIKO and DIPA could represent a strategic prospect ahead of 2028.
Supporters of cooperation with DISY within DIKO argue that parliamentary cooperation between the two parties is already strong and that they share similar positions on issues such as Ukraine and the war in Gaza. By contrast, they believe no common path exists with AKEL, either in or outside parliament, citing deep policy divergences and accusing AKEL of irresponsible and populist positions on economic issues.
Nikolas Papadopoulos’ position
DIKO leader Nikolas Papadopoulos has never openly disavowed this school of thought. When asked whether the Centre’s inclination is towards cooperation with DISY, he avoided a direct answer, stating that future alliances would be discussed “when the time comes”.
While Papadopoulos has repeatedly raised issues of poor coordination with the government, he has consistently defended Christodoulides’s administration and has been the only governing party leader to fully support the government during difficult moments.
Following the deadly summer wildfires in mountainous Limassol, dissatisfaction grew within governing parties, and calls for a Cabinet reshuffle intensified. Speculation about future DIKO–DISY cooperation also increased. However, during a joint parliamentary committee session on the fires, Papadopoulos clashed with House Speaker Annita Demetriou over procedure and strongly defended the responsible ministers. For some within DISY, this marked a significant shift, suggesting DIKO was stepping back from the brink of exiting the government.
Interpretations of Papadopoulos’s stance suggest behind-the-scenes consultations with the President over the reshuffle, during which some DIKO demands were satisfied. DIKO’s participation in government increased following the reshuffle, silencing internal dissent and cooling flirtation with DISY.
Parliamentary elections
DIKO now faces an existential threat affecting the broader Centre and traditional parties. Polls show significant declines for historic parties, with a serious risk of the intermediate space shrinking dramatically. Of the three centre parties, only DIKO is projected to enter parliament, but with reduced influence, losing its third-place ranking and kingmaker role.
Meanwhile, ELAM, Faidias Panayiotou’s Direct Democracy movement, and Odysseas Michaelides’s ALMA appear poised to gain ground.
DIKO recognises it cannot cooperate with newly formed, personality-driven parties and fears political marginalisation if the Centre disappears from the political map. This has prompted renewed efforts to unite with DIPA and EDEK, reviving calls for a centrist alliance. In 2021, the three parties together secured 24 per cent of the vote. Today, DIKO struggles to reach double digits.
Presidential elections
The outcome of the parliamentary elections is seen as critical. If the Centre fails to survive the May 2026 elections and DIKO falls to a single-digit result, possibly fifth or sixth place, a new political landscape will emerge, raising major dilemmas ahead of the 2028 presidential elections.
As a centre-right party, DIKO will face two options: continue its cooperation with Nikos Christodoulides in a bid for his re-election, under even tougher terms given its weakened position; or pursue cooperation with DISY, provided it can secure better terms and greater participation in government.
At present, however, the data suggest little room for change. DIKO appears likely to find itself squeezed between Nikos Christodoulides and DISY in the post-election landscape.
This article was originally published in the Politis Sunday Edition.