By George Koumoullis
More than half a century after the events of 1974, the Cyprus problem remains one of the longest-running unresolved political problems in the world. Over the years, settlement plans have been put forward, countless rounds of talks have been held and various constitutional formulas have been tabled. Yet none of these efforts has led to a final settlement, and the wound of Cyprus continues to fester. The Greek Cypriot side attributes this tragic state of affairs to Turkey’s intransigence, while the Turkish side blames Greek Cypriots’ unwillingness to share power with Turkish Cypriots. Both interpretations are simplistic and one-dimensional, and neither touches the foundations of the problem.
What, then, are the fundamental differences that make the problem so intractable? First of all, there is the question of security. For most Greek Cypriots, the presence of Turkish troops and the retention of intervention rights are incompatible with the full sovereignty of an independent state. On the other hand, most Turkish Cypriots (89%, according to a recent poll) believe that without guarantees and Turkey’s support their community would be wiped out, as happened in Crete. In other words, one side prioritises sovereignty while the other prioritises security. Both concerns are real, but they collide.
Another serious problem is identity. Despite more than 60 years of independence, most citizens of the Republic of Cyprus still define themselves first and foremost as Greeks of Cyprus or Turks of Cyprus. The shared Cypriot civic identity remains relatively weak. If a Turkish Cypriot wins international recognition, for example, it does not stir admiration in the average Greek Cypriot, and vice versa. When Marcos Baghdatis reached the final of the Australian Open in 2006, few Turkish Cypriots felt it was a success that belonged to them too. As I have stressed in previous articles, strengthening a shared Cypriot civic identity does not require abandoning Greek or Turkish identity, but developing a common sense of political participation and a shared future.
Equally important is the fact that the two communities hold different conceptions of justice. For Greek Cypriots, the central question is how to remedy the consequences of the invasion, the occupation, displacement and the loss of property. For Turkish Cypriots, the key aim is to secure political equality and their collective security. Both sides invoke justice, but they start from different points and different priorities.
Added to this is the power of historical memory. Greek Cypriots remember above all the invasion, the missing and the refugees. Turkish Cypriots remember the intercommunal clashes of 1963–64, life in the enclaves from 1964 to 1974 and the sense of exclusion from the state. These narratives are not false. They become problematic because each is presented as the only truth, and so the trauma of one community leaves the other indifferent. Anyone who mentions the suffering of the other community is branded a tourkosporos or ellinosporos, a “Turk’s seed” or “Greek’s seed”, depending on which community they belong to.
Perhaps the clearest example of this clash of memories is 20 July 1974. For Greek Cypriots, it is a day of national mourning, invasion, displacement and loss. For many Turkish Cypriots, by contrast, the same date symbolises liberation from the “Greek Cypriot yoke”, their own equivalent of 25 March, Greek Independence Day. In short, the same historical event produces two diametrically opposed collective memories. When one community celebrates what the other mourns, it becomes clear that the problem reaches beyond territory, property, political equality or international relations, down to the very way the two sides understand their history. This reveals how difficult it is to build a shared political community.
Nationalism also helps derail a solution when it turns national aspirations into non-negotiable dogmas and treats every compromise as a retreat or a betrayal. At the same time, education, public rhetoric and national anniversaries often reproduce one-dimensional historical narratives and events that deepen suspicion towards the other community. When Turkish Cypriots see fans of “patriotic” football clubs on television every Sunday holding banners reading “Cyprus is Greek” or “EOKA B strike again”, how are they supposed to agree to the abolition of guarantees? Tackling the problem requires an education system independent of the Church, one that cultivates critical thinking, presents multiple historical perspectives, encourages contact between the two communities and promotes citizenship above ethnic divisions. Are we prepared to do all this? If not, the shared political culture essential to a viable solution to the Cyprus problem cannot develop.
In sum, perhaps the deepest reason the problem remains unsolved is the absence of a shared political “we”. As long as the two communities continue to see the past, justice, security and even the nature of the state they want differently, every compromise runs up against existential fears. In other words, the Cyprus problem remains unsolved because security, justice, identity and historical memory are all colliding at once. And as long as no basic shared narrative of the past and the future takes shape, every agreement will risk remaining a legal formula, and reunification will remain a chimera.
This article by George Koumoullis was originally published in Greek in Politis on 14 November 2026.


